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Abstract
This paper studies trading in a two-sided market where firms strategically form a network.
In a networked market, manufacturers and suppliers must be connected by links for trading.
We show that if no contingent contract is available, then any pairwise Nash stable network is
inefficient. Each supplier under-invests in links (a hold-up problem). If a contract contingent
on direct links is available and link cost is low, then the under-investment problem solves. Fur-
thermore, the complete network resulting in the Walrasian outcome is uniquely pairwise Nash
stable. However, this outcome is also inefficient. A new hold-up problem, over-investment in
links, arises.
1 Introduction
We often observe that firms build bilateral connections only with specific partners. In many
industries, upstream firms and downstream firms invest in relation-specific assets such as the In-
ternet, electric power lines, and pipelines to distribute their resources.
Such a bilateral relationship is called a link, and a pattern of links between upstream firms and
downstream firms is called a network. Since each pair of firms must be linked for trading, architec-
ture of networks will play a central role in the networked market. This paper examines whether
decentralized trading in a manufacturer-supplier networked market with divisible goods achieves
efficient and the competitive trading, comparing to the standard competitive market theory.
Recently, the bueyr-seller networked market has attracted much attention (Corominas-Bosch
[4], Kranton andMinehart [9, 10]). For example, Kranton andMinehart [10] show that every efficient
network is an equilibrium outcome. However, they studies centralized trading. It is assumed that
an existence of centralized mechanisms; an auctioneer (Kranton and Minehart [10]) and a match-
maker (Corominas-Bosch [4]). These social planners can collect allmessages and impose any trading
using predetermined mechanisms. In a manufacturer-supplier networked market, however, firms
*I am very grateful to Professor Akira Okada for his guidance and encouragement. I also thank Kalyan Chatterjee,
DaisukeOyama, FumitoshiMoriya, NozomuMuto, Yasuhiro Arai, and participants in seminars at Hitotsubashi Univer-
sity, SWET 2008, 2010, and 14th DC Conference in Japan for helpful comments. This work is supported by Grant-in-Aid
for Japan Society for the Promotion of Science (JSPS) Fellows.
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are not anonymous, price-taking, and match-taking. Therefore, no such centralized mechanisms
are available, and any trading is decentralized.
One of the seminal studies about the decentralized trading in a non-networked buyer-sellermar-
ket is Rubinstein and Wolinsky [11]. They find that the Walrasian equilibrium trading between
buyers and sellers is supported by a unique subgame perfect equilibrium if strategies for traders
are restricted to stationary strategies. Gale and Sabourian [6] extend this result to a market with
heterogeneous buyers and sellers. However, these studies cannot apply to the networked market
since they assume that any buyer can be paired with any seller through the random matching.
Furthermore, the above studies of buyer-seller market assume unit demands and unit supplies.
Each buyer demands one unit of (indivisible) goods and each seller owns one unit of goods. Thus,
goods have to be traded through a one-to-one matching. Gale [5] points out that in the one-to-
one matching market, it is difficult to examine whether the results support the competitive market
theory since the competitive outcome coincides with the monopolistic outcome.
Comparing to the buyers-seller market, it is natural that goods are traded through a many-to-
many matching in a manufacturer-supplier networked market. Each supplier usually sell goods
to multi manufacturers, and vice versa. Thus, we assume that divisible goods are traded by multi
firms in a manufacturer-supplier networked market.
Therefore, we study decentralized trading in a manufacturer-supplier networked market with
divisible goods. Our study focuses on two points to discover how network architecture affects on
trading. The first is transaction cost. The competitive market theory assumes any trader can buy
or sell goods to any other trader with no transaction cost. Then, the Walrasian equilibrium is al-
ways efficient. However, any firm must bear transaction costs to establish links in the networked
manufacturer-supplier market. Then, the competitive market mechanism may implement an inef-
ficient allocation (Coase [3], Williamson [13]). The second is to find a role of side-payment contracts
for decentralized trading in the networkedmarket. We compare a case where no side-payment con-
tracts is available with a casewhere simple side-payment contracts contingent on links are available.
We first analyses a networked market consisting of two heterogeneous manufacturers, two het-
erogeneous suppliers, and one type of divisible goods. It is a minimal economy where any firm
in each side is competitive. It is shown that in this small networked market, any stable outcome
is inefficient, regardless of the presence of side-payment contracts. When all firms are symmetric,
we further show that the result holds in a large networked market consisting of n manufacturers
and n suppliers (n  3). The origin of the inefficiency is an under-investment problem if no side-
payment contract is available. In contrast, it is an over-investment problem if side-payment contracts
are available.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 gives a formal definition of the net-
worked market with divisible goods. Section 3 analyses the networked market by the competitive
market theory as a benchmark. We introduce the notions of the competitive market theory into the
2
networked market; the g-competitive equilibrium and the g-efficient allocation. We then show a
version of the first fundamental theorem of welfare economics, i.e. any g-competitive equilibrium
allocation is g-efficient.
Next, we construct a strategic trading game. The game has two stages, a network formation
stage and a bargaining stage. Manufacturers and suppliers establish a network in the first stage and
they trade on that network in the second stage. Section 4 constructs the bargaining game on a given
network. We show that the unique linear subgame perfect equilibrium allocation is g-efficient for
all g, but it is g-competitive if and only if the network is complete. If a supplier links with multi
manufacturers then he obtain their surplus, otherwise he obtains no surplus.
Section 5 constructs a network formation game. All firms announce the set of partners with
whom they want to link. Bilateral investments of a manufacturer and a supplier in relationship-
specific assets enable them to trade. Thus, any link in networks is established if and only if both a
manufacturer and a supplier bilaterally agree to form it. We show that, in this link-announcement
game, an empty and a supplier-monopolized network are pairwise Nash stable and any efficient
network is not Nash stable.
Section 6 extends the link announcement game. Manufacturers and suppliers often contract
with side-payments contingent on their links. Each firm can offer a contingent contract that (s)he
pays transfer if a partner agreeswith forming a link. When cost of forming a link is low, the complete
networked market is pairwise Nash stable in this network formation game with direct transfer. In
the complete networked market, however, the stable trading is inefficient since firms over-invest in
links.
Section 7 analyses a large economy where there are n symmetric manufacturers and n symmet-
ric suppliers. We show that any pairwise Nash stable outcome is inefficient in the large market.
Section 8 concludes with several remarks.
2 Networked Market
This section introduces a two-sided networked market. There are n manufacturers I (indexed
by i = 1, 2, ..., n), n suppliers J (indexed by j = 1, 2, ..., n), one type of resources (or intermediate
goods) x 2 R, and money. We assume that their payoff functions are quasi-linear. Each supplier j
owns his endowment of resourceswj > 0, and has no valuation over resources x.Eachmanufacturer
i has the following profit function f i : R! R.1
Assumption 1. For all i 2 I, profit function f i is twice differentiable and
1.1 f i(0) = 0 and d f
i
dxi (0) = +¥,
1.2 f i is strictly increasing; d f
i
dxi > 0, and
1We can alternatively interpret each manufacturer i and each supplier j as a final consumer and a retailer, respec-
tively. In this case, f i is i’s utility function.
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Figure 1: Feasible architecture of the 2 2 networked market. Manufacturers are in upper row and
suppliers are in lower row.
1.3 f i is strictly concave; d
2 f i
d(xi)2 < 0.
A networked market is given by ( f i,wj, g)i2I,j2J . Trading in a networked market is restricted
by network g  fijgi2I,j2J which is a non-directed bipartite graph, where ij is a non-directed
link between manufacturer i and supplier j. Figure 1 illustrates the set of all feasible types of net-
works G when n = 2. Let hi(g), hj(g) be the number of links of manufacturer i, supplier j, and
Li(g), Lj(g) be the set of agents linked with manufacturer i, supplier j, respectively. We denote
the empty network (åsj=1 hj(ge) = 0) by ge, and the complete network (hj(gc) = 2 for all j) by gc.
Each manufacturer i can buy resources from supplier j if and only if they are linked (j 2 Li(g)). In
what follows, we abbreviate networked market ( f i,wj, g)i2I,j2J as gwhenever no confusion arises.
3 Benchmark: g-Competitive Equilibrium
This section applies the competitivemarketmechanism to the networkedmarket. We first define
the competitive equilibrium in networkedmarket g. Let pij(g) be a price when i buys resource from
j in g, and p(g) = (p11(g), p
1
2(g), p
2
1(g), ..., p
n
n(g)).
Definition 1. An outcome ( p˜(g), x˜(g)) is competitive relative to g (g-competitive) if
(i) for i 2 I, (x˜i1(g), ..., x˜in(g)) 2 argmax f i(åj xij)   åj p˜ij(g)xij subject to xij = 0 for any
ij /2 g, and
(ii) for j 2 J, (x˜1j (g), ..., x˜nj (g)) 2 argmaxåi p˜ij(g)xij subject to åi xij  wj and xij = 0 for any
ij /2 g.
The gc-competitive equilibrium is theWalrasian equilibrium.
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Wemake two remarks. First, x˜ij(g) can be negative. If x˜
i
j(g) < 0, manufacturer i sells resources
to supplier j. However, åj x˜ij(g) > 0 for any i with h
i(g)  1 and any g since any i has zero
endowments. Thus, any manufacturer i can sell resources if i has more than two links and buy
resources from other suppliers.
Second, a non-uniform price vector conditional on links are allowed in g. However, any g-
competitive equilibrium ( p˜(g), x˜(g)) satisfies a uniform price among (directly or indirectly) con-
nected agents. If it does not hold, then there is a firm who can arbitrage.
Let p˜j(g) be the competitive price for agents connected to supplier j. Thus,
d f i
dxij
(åk x˜ik(g)) =
p˜j(g) for any i 2 Lj(g). We next show a version of the first fundamental theorem of welfare
economics, i.e. any g-competitive equilibrium allocation is constrained efficient for all g 2 G.
Definition 2. Let denote a (Pareto-)efficient allocation relative to g (g-efficient allocation) by xˆ(g) =
(xˆ11(g), xˆ
1
2(g), xˆ
2
1(g), ..., xˆ
n
n(g)). It is a solution of the following maximization problem:
max
x åi2I
f i(å
j
xij)
subject to å
i
xij  wj for j 2 J,
xij = 0 for all ij /2 g.
The solution xˆ(g) is not unique generally. However, (åj xˆ1j (g), ...,åj xˆ
n
j (g)) is unique by con-
cavity of f i. We denote the corresponding social welfare for g by Pˆ(g) = åi f i(xˆi(g)). For all
g, g0 2 G, if g  g0 then Pˆ(g)  Pˆ(g0).
Proposition 1. Any g-competitive equilibrium allocation is g-efficient.
Proof. For any ij /2 g, xij(g) = 0. Thus, if Lj(g) = Æ, then x˜j(g) = xˆj(g) = (0, ..., 0) for any j 2 J.
Next, we consider the case where Lj(g) 6= Æ. Then, åi x˜ij(g) = wj by condition (ii). Sup-
pose that there is an allocation y that (Pareto-)dominates g-competitive equilibrium allocation x˜(g).
Then, y is infeasible sinceåi yij > åi x˜
i
j(g) = wj for some j by strict monotonicity of f
i. Therefore,
any g-competitive equilibrium allocation is g-efficient.
Next, we define Consumer Surplus (CS) and Producer Surplus (PS) in the standard manner. For
manufacturer i 2 I, CS relative to g for i is given by
CSi(g) = f i(å
j
xˆij(g)) å
j
p˜j(g)xˆij(g),
and for supplier j 2 J, PS relative to g for j is given by
PSj(g) = p˜j(g)å
i
xˆij(g) = p˜j(g)wj.
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In the g-competitive equilibrium, each manufacturer i obtains CSi(g) and each supplier j obtains
PSj(g). Note that CSi(g)  CSi(g n fijg) for any g since ål2J xˆil(g)  ål2Jnf j g xˆil(g n fijg),
and PSj(g)  PSj(g n fijg) for any g since p˜(g)  p˜(g n fijg).
The game proceeds as follows: Manufacturers and suppliers form a trading network in the first
stage (Network formation game). Then, they allocate resources and money given a network in the
second stage (Bargaining game). We solve the game by backward induction.
4 Bargaining Game in Networked Market
We first analyses a small networked market with n = 2.2 An economy is a bilateral duopoly,
which is a minimal economy where any firm in each side is competitive. The set of feasible archi-
tecture of networks is given in Figure 1. For g 2 G n f g4 g, the g-competitive price is uniform and
unique among all connected firms, given by p˜(g). Thus, p˜(g) = d f
i
dxij
(åk x˜ik(g)) for i, j = 1, 2.
Protocol First, we formulate a bargaining protocol after network g is formed. Given a network
g 2 G, each manufacturer i proposes a payment schedule to supplier j with j 2 Li(g) contingent
on an allotment from j to i, xij. A bargaining protocol is given by the following non-linear price
competition:
Step 1: Every manufacturer i bids payment schedule tij(x
i
j) to supplier j for all j 2 Li(g).
Step 2: Given a schedule profile, supplier j allocate its endowment tomanufacturers xj(t) = (x1j (t), x
2
j (t)).
An allocation xj(t) is feasible if åi xij(t)  wj, and xij(t)  0 for all i /2 Lj(g).
In Step 2, independently of the other supplier, given g and (t1j , t
2
j ), each supplier j maximizes
his payoff function
Pj(x1j , x
2
j ) =å
i2I
tij(x
i
j(t)). (1)
Let xj (t) = (x
1
j (t), x
2
j (t)) 2 argmaxPj(x1j , x2j ). Then, a payoff function for manufacturer i is
given by
Pi(t) = f i(xi1 (t) + x
i
2 (t)) å
j2J
tij(x
i
j (t)). (2)
Linear bidding and Equilibrium We focus on linear subgame perfect equilibria (linear SPEs), whereas
the strategy space includes all non-linear bidding. A linear bidding strategy is defined as follows:
Definition 3 (Linear Bidding). A payment schedule from i to j, tij(x
i
j), is linear if t
i
j(x
i
j) satisfies for
2Let i and j be a manufacturer who is not i and a supplier who is not j, respectively.
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price pij,
tij(x
i
j) = p
i
jx
i
j.
A strategy for manufacturer i is linear bidding strategy if tij(x
i
j) is linear for all j 2 Li(g), and a
strategy profile is a linear SPE if the profile is a SPE in which all manufacturers adopt linear bidding
strategies.
The linear SPEs are characterized as follows.
Proposition 2. For each g 2 G, there exists a linear SPE with price vector p such that for all i,
pij (g) =
8><>:
0 if hj(g) = 0, 1
p˜(g) if hj(g) = 2.
The corresponding linear SPE payoff vectorP(g) is given by for all i,
P1(g) = CSi(g) + å
j2Li(g), hj(g)=1
PSj(g)
and for all j,
Pj (g) =
8><>:
0 if hj = 0, 1
PSj(g) if hj = 2.
Proof. When hj(g)  1 for all j (i.e. g 2 f g1, g2, g4 g ), the bargaining game is the standard
ultimatum bargaining. Thus, pij (g) = 0. Each supplier j allocates all endowments to the linked
manufacturer, and each manufacturer obtains all profits in any linear SPE.
We then show that for any g and any supplier j with hj(g) = 2, p1j (g) = p
2
j (g) in any
linear SPE. Suppose p1j (g) > p
2
j (g). Then, manufacturer 1 can deviates to decrease p
1
j (g) =
p1j (g)  e for sufficiently small e > 0.
When g3 is given, there are twomanufacturers and one supplier in themarket. Consider a linear
bidding strategy profile t2 = (t12 , t22 ) such that for any manufacturer i = 1, 2,
pi2 = p˜(g
3) =
d f i
dxi
(xˆi(g3)),
and supplier 2 chooses x2 = (x˜12(g3), x˜22(g3)). In this profile, (x˜12(g3), x˜22(g3)), (w2, 0), and
(0,w2) are best replies for supplier 2. If manufacturer 1 deviates to p12 + e then supplier 2 chooses
(x12, x
2
2) = (w2, 0) and deviates to p
1
2   e then supplier 2 chooses (x12, x22) = (0,w2) for any
7
e > 0. Both are not profitable since (p12 , x12 ) = ( p˜12(g3), x˜12(g3)). Thus, this strategy profile
constitutes a SPE, and the corresponding SPE payoff vector isP(g3).
When g5 is given, there are two manufacturers and two suppliers in the market. Consider an
linear strategy profile ((t11 , t
1
2 ), t
2
2 ) such that for manufacturer 1,
p11 = 0
p12 = p˜(g5) =
d f 1
dx1
(x˜1(g5))
and for manufacturer 2,
p22 = p˜(g5) =
d f 2
dx2
(x˜2(g5)).
Linear bidding t11 (x
1
1) is optimal by L1(g
5) = f1g, and (t12 , t22 ) constitutes a linear SPE since it
is a linear SPE of g3 given x11 = w1 . Hence, this profile constitutes a linear SPE and generates a
payoff vectorP(g5).
When gc is given, consider a linear strategy profile ((t11 , t
1
2 ), (t
2
1 , t
2
2 )) such that for manufac-
turer i = 1, 2 and supplier j = 1, 2,
pij = p˜(g
c) =
d f i
dxi
(x˜i(gc)),
and (x1j (t
), x2j (t
)) = (x˜1j (g
c), x˜2j (g
c)) for supplier j = 1, 2. In this profile, (x˜1j (g
c), x˜2j (g
c)) is a
best reply for all j and each supplier j is indifferent to choose (x˜1j (g
c), x˜2j (g
c)), (0,wj), and (wj, 0).
Thus, this strategy profile constitutes a linear SPE and generates a payoff vectorP(gc).
The above linear SPE is not a unique SPE, but the unique linear SPE.
Proposition 3. (p, x) is the unique linear SPE.
Proof. Obviously, if hj(g) = 1, then pij = 0 and x
i
j = wj for all i, j in any linear SPE. Thus, when
g1, g2, or g4 is given, there is a unique SPE.
Consider any j with hj(g) = 2. Then, since g 2 f g3, g5, gc g, pj (g) = p˜(g). Suppose that
there is a linear SPE t = (p(g), x(g)) with p1j (g) = p
2
j (g) > p˜(g) for some g and j. Consider a
non-linear bidding t¯ij such that for some pair ( p¯
i
j, y¯
i
j),
t¯ij(x
i
j) =
8><>:
p¯ijx
i
j if x
i
j  y¯ij
p¯ijy¯
i
j if x
i
j > y¯
i
j.
By wj = åi xij(g) = åi x˜
i
j(g), we obtain x
i
j (t)  x˜ij(g) for some i. Since pij(g) > p˜(g), it is
profitable for such manufacturer i to deviate t¯ij with ( p¯
i
j, y¯
i
j) = (p
i
j(g), x
i
j(g)  e) for some e > 0.
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Next, suppose that there is a linear SPE t = (p(g), x(g)) with p1j (g) = p
2
j (g) < p˜(g) for
some g and some j. Since p˜(g) > pij(g) for some i, it is profitable for such i to deviate a non-linear
schedule t¯ij with p¯
i
j = p
i
j + e and y¯
i
j such that
d f i
dxi (y¯
i
j + x
i
 j(g)) = p¯
i
j. Therefore, p
i
j =
d f i
dxi (x˜
i(g))
for all j with Lj(g) = f1, 2g in any linear SPE.
Suppose that (x1j (t), x
2
j (t)) 6= (x˜1j (g), x˜2j (g)). Then, there is a manufacturer with xij (t) >
x˜ij(g). For such manufacturer i, it is a profitable to deviate t¯
i
j with y¯
i
j = x˜
i
j(g). Hence, x

j (t) =
(x˜1j (g), x˜
2
j (g)) in any linear SPE.
By Proposition 2 and 3, we obtain the following corollaries, straightforwardly.
Corollary 1. The linear SPE allocation x(g) is g-efficient for all g 2 G.
Corollary 2. The linear SPE (p(g), x(g)) is g-competitive if and only if g = gc.
When gc is given, the set of feasible trading is the same as the set of feasible allocation in the non-
networked market since all manufacturers can trade with all suppliers. In addition, manufacturers
and suppliers are competitive since any manufacturer and any supplier have two links. Thus, the
equilibrium allocation coincides with the Walrasian allocation. For any g 2 G n f gc g, however,
there always exists a supplier who has only one link. That supplier sells resources at price 0 in the
linear SPE. Thus, the linear SPE is not g-competitive.
5 Formation of Networked Market
We have studied trading in the bargaining stage (the subgame after a network is formed). Next,
we study a network formation game. We first introduce transaction cost to form links. Let li(g) and
lj(g) denote cost functions to form network g for manufacturer i and supplier j respectively.
Assumption 2. Each link cost function li and lj satisfy the following for all i 2 I and j 2 J:
2.1 li(g) = lhi(g) and lj(g) = lhj(g), where l > 0 is a constant.
2.2 CSi(g)  lhi(g) > 0 if Li(g) 6= Æ and PSj(g)  lhj(g) > 0 if Lj(g) 6= Æ for all g.
2.3 SW(g5) > max f SW(g2), SW(g3) g.
Assumption 2.1 is the standard linearity assumption of link cost function. Each link ij is formed
at strictly positive cost l for bothmanufacturer i and supplier j. ByAssumption 2.2, the g-competitive
allocation is more profitable than no trading for any firms and any network. This assumption im-
plies that SW(ge) < SW(g1) < SW(g4). Assumption 2.3 implies that g is inefficient when there
is an agent who does not participate the networked market.
Then, we define a social welfare function as
SW(g) =å
i
[Pi(g)  lhi(g)] +å
j
[Pj (g)  lhj(g)].
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The efficient network is gˆ 2 argmaxg SW(g), and the efficient allocation of resources is xˆ(gˆ).
If g = gc, then there is an efficient allocation xˆ(gc) such that there is at least one link ij with
xˆij(g
c) = 0. Thus, at least one type of g5 satisfies xˆij(g
c) = xˆij(g
5) for any link ij 2 gc. For such g5,
SW(gc) < SW(g5). Therefore, for any economy ( f 1, f 2,w1,w2),
gˆ 2 fg4, g5g. (3)
In particular, if all manufacturers and suppliers are symmetric ( f 1 = f 2 and w1 = w2), then
g4 = gˆ.
5.1 Link-Announcement Game
Weadopt the link-announcement game (Jackson [8]) as a network formation game. Allmanufac-
turers and suppliers announce a set of agents with whom they want to form links simultaneously.
We denote a (pure) strategy of manufacturer i by si = (sij)j2S, and a strategy of supplier j by
sj = (sij)i2B, where sij, sij 2 f+, g. If sij = + then manufacturer i wants to link with sup-
plier j and if sij = + then supplier j wants to link with manufacturer i. A link ij is formed if and
only if both manufacturer i and supplier j agree with forming link ij, i.e. ij 2 g(s) if and only if
sij = sij = +.
Thus, payoffs of manufacturer i and supplier j are given by
fi(g(s)) = Pi(t(g(s)), x(g(s)))  lhi(g(s)) (4)
fj(g(s)) = Pj(t(g(s)), x(g(s)))  lhj(g(s)). (5)
We assume that all agents play a linear SPE after any network is formed. A profile (s, t(g), x(g)) is
a Nash equilibrium if (t(g), x(g)) is a linear SPE in the bargaining game for all g, and for all i and
j,
fi(g(s))  fi(g(s0i, s i)),
fj(g(s))  fj(g(s0j, s j)).
A network g is Nash stable (NS) if there exists a Nash equilibrium with g(s) = g.
It is well-known that the Nash stability is a weak concept for bilateral network formation games.
There are many NS networks (e.g. the empty network is always Nash stable for all network for-
mation games). A standard refinement of Nash stability proposed by Bloch and Jackson [1] is the
pairwise Nash stability (PNS). In addition to the Nash stability, we demands that there is no profitable
pairwise deviation.
Definition 4. A network g is pairwise Nash stable if it is Nash stable and there does not exist a link
10
ij /2 g(s) such that
fi(g(s) [ fijg)  fi(g(s))
fj(g(s) [ fijg)  fj(g(s))
with strict inequality for one of two agents.
5.2 Stable Market Structure
First, suppose that l = 0 instead of Assumption 2.1. Then, Proposition 2 implies that the com-
plete network gc is the unique PNS network since forming any link ij is profitable for i and j, i.e.
Pi(g [ fijg)  Pi(g) and Pj (g [ fijg)  Pj (g) with strict inequality one of two agents for
all g and ij /2 g. Therefore, if there is no transaction cost, the unique stable market structure is the
complete networked market resulting in the Walrasian outcome.
Hereafter, we assume that l > 0. The next proposition shows that any efficient network and the
complete network are not Nash stable.
Proposition 4. In the link-announcement game,
(i) The network ge and g3 are PNS.
(ii) The other networks g1, g2, g4, g5, and gc are not NS.
Proof. Part i: By Proposition 2,Pj (g
e [fijg) = 0 for any ij and j. Then, there is no link ij satisfying
fj(ge [ fijg)  fj(ge) =  l  0. Hence, ge is PNS.
For g3, since all manufacturers obtain non-negative payoffs and have only one link, there is no
incentive to cut a link for manufacturers. If supplier 2 who obtain non-negative payoff cut any one
of links then 2’s payoff is  l and if supplier 2 cut both then 2’s payoff is 0. Hence, supplier 2 also
has no incentive to cut links. By Proposition 2, P1(g
3 [ f11g) = P1(g5) = P1(g3) = 0. Then,
supplier 1 has no incentive to form link 11 since f1(g3 [ f11g)  f1(g3) =  l < 0.
Part ii: If CSi(gc)   2l  CSi(gc n fijg)   l  0 holds for all i, j, there is no incentive for
manufacturer i to cut any links in Li(gc). However, there is an efficient allocation with xˆij(g
c) = 0
for some ij. Let xˆ21(g
c) = 0. This implies that P2(gc) = P2(g5). Hence, cutting the link 21 is
profitable for the manufacturer 2.
Similarly, for other networks g1, g2, g4, or g5, supplier 1 obtains no profit. Thus, supplier 1
deviates by cutting a link.
An under-investment problem Networks ge, g3 never become efficient network by (3). This inef-
ficiency is caused by a hold-up problem (Hart and Moore [7]). When a pair of a manufacturer and
a supplier jointly invest in a link (a relation-specific asset), cost of forming link is not contractible
11
and sunk in the bargaining stage. Thus, under-investment arises for suppliers since they have less
bargaining power.
6 Side-payment Contracts
In the previous section, we assume that no side-payment contract contingent on links is avail-
able for all firms. They sometimes, however, can write some simple contingent contract with side-
payments. This section studies a network formation game with direct side-payments.
Network Formation Game with Direct Side-Payments Bloch and Jackson [2] propose a network
formation game which allows direct side-payments when agents form a network. In their network
formation game with direct side-payments, every manufacturer i and supplier j simultaneously
announce a vector of transfers ti 2 Rs, tj 2 Rb. All manufacturers and suppliers can only transfer
to form links with which they involved. We denote the element of ti by tij 2 R, which represents
transfer that manufacturer i proposes to form link ij and tj by tij 2 R, which represents transfer
that supplier j proposes to form link ij. Link ij is formed if and only if tij + tij  0. A network
g(t) = fijjtij + tij  0g, where t = (t1, t2, t1, t2) is a profile of announced vectors of transfers.
The payoffs for manufacturer i and supplier j are defined by
Fi(g(t)) = fi(g(t))  å
im2g(t)
tim
Fj(g(t)) = fj(g(t))  å
jk2g(t)
tjk.
Given t, let t ij indicate the profile of transfers found simply by deleting tij and tij. The stability
concepts in the network formation game with direct transfer are defined in the same manner.
Definition 5. A strategy profile (t, t(g), x(g)) is a Nash equilibrium if (t(g), x(g)) is a linear SPE
in the bargaining game for all g, and for all i and j,
Fi(g(t))  Fi(g(t0i, t i))
Fj(g(t))  Fj(g(t0j , t j)).
A network g is Nash stable with direct transfer (NSd) if there is a Nash equilibrium with g(t) = g.
A network g is pairwise Nash stable with direct transfer (PNSd) if it is NSd and there exists no
ij /2 g(t) such that for all t0ij, t0ij,
Fi(g(t ij, t0ij, t0ij)) +Fj(g(t ij, t
0ij, t0ij)) > F
i(g(t)) +Fj(g(t)).
Lemma 1. In the network formation game with direct transfer, any efficient network gˆ is NSd but not PNSd.
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Furthermore, the set of PNSd networks is empty or fgcg.
Proof. First note that gˆ 2 fg4, g5g. Suppose gˆ = g4. Since CSi(fijg) + PSj(fijg)  2l for all
i, j, there is a profile t such that no deviation to cut any link is profitable. Hence, there is a Nash
equilibrium t such that g(t) = g4. Thus, g4 is NSd when gˆ = g4.
Next, suppose gˆ = g5. Then,CSi(g5) = CSi(gc) and PSj(g5) = PSj(gc) since xˆ(g5) = xˆ(gc)
for all i and j. Consider any profile t satisfying t11 =  t11 = l, t12 =  t12 =  l, t21 + t21 < 0,
and t22 =  t22 = CS2(g5)  l. Then, g(t) = g5. Since F2(g(t)) = F1(g(t)) = 0, there is no
profitable deviation for manufacturer 2 and supplier 1. Furthermore, manufacturer 1 and supplier
2 have no profitable deviation since
CS1(gc) + PS1(gc)  2l  max[CS1(g3),CS1(g4) + PS1(g4)  2l]
CS2(gc) + PS2(gc)  4l  CS2(gc)  2l
Hence, g5 is NSd.
However, sinceP1(g5)+P2(g5) P1(g4) P2(g4) = CS1(g5)+åj PSj(g5) CS1(g4) 
PS1(g4) > 2l andP2(gc) +P1(g
c) P2(g5) P1(g5) = CS2(gc) + PS1(gc)  CS2(g5) >
2l by Assumption 2.2, g4 and g5 are not pairwise Nash stable. Hence, any efficient network is not
pairwise Nash stable. By the same procedure, we can show that ge, g1, g2, and g3 are not pairwise
Nash stable.
Next, we show that the competitive outcome in the complete networked market gc (the Wal-
rasian outcome) is the unique pairwise Nash stable outcome when the link cost l is small.
Proposition 5. Suppose that PSj(gc)  4l for all j. In the network formation gamewith direct side-payments,
the complete network gc is the unique PNSd network.
Proof. First, we construct t with g(t) = gc such that there is no incentive to cut any link. Consider
a profile t such that tij =  tij =  l for all ij. Then the manufacturer i has no incentive to cut
any link since CSi(gc)  CSi(gc n fijg) for all ij and i’s transfer from j,  tij, is equal to cost of
maintaining link. Also, the supplier j has no incentive to cut any link sincePj (g
c)  2l  å tij =
PSj(gc)  4l  0. Hence, gc is a PNSd network. By Lemma 1, it is the unique PNSd network.
In constrast, when l is high, there is no pairwise Nash equilibrium with direct side-payments
for some economy ( f 1, f 2,w1,w2). There is a supplier who deviates to cut a link in the complete
network. We consider a symmetric economy ( f 1, f 2,w1,w2) where f 1 = f 2 and w1 = w2.
Proposition 6. Suppose that an economy is symmetric and PS(gc) < 4l. Then, gc is not NSd, and there is
no PNSd network.
Proof. When all agents are symmetric, CSi(gc) = CSi(g5) for any i and any type of g5. Thus, in gc,
there is no incentive for any manufacturer i to cut link ij if and only if tij   l for all j. However,
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since PS(gc) < 4l, such transfer (t1j, t2j) is not profitable for any supplier j. Hence, each supplier
has an incentive to cut a link, and gc is not NSd. Since any other network is not pairwise Nash stable
by Lemma 1, there is no PNSd network.
An over-investment problem A new hold-up problem arises in the network formation with di-
rect side-payments. Suppose that link cost is low. By Lemma 1, the complete networked market
is uniquely pairwise Nash stable. Each suppliers j has an incentive to form two links 1j and 2j by
transferring link cost l to bothmanufacturers for j’s surplus PSjwhen 4l < PSj. Since theWalrasian
outcome is an equilibrium outcome in the bargaining subgame when the market is completely net-
worked, it is supported by the network formation game with direct side-payments. However, it is
not efficient by (3). There is a link ij in which there is no trading in the complete networked market
(xˆij(g
c) = 0). Therefore, there is an over-investment problem due to excess link formation.
7 Large Economy
We have shown that the stable allocation is inefficient in the small networked market consisting
of two manufacturers and two suppliers. This section studies a large symmetric networked mar-
ket. Suppose that an economy consists of n symmetric manufacturers and n symmetric suppliers
(n  3). All manufacturers have the same profit function f and all suppliers have the same endow-
ment w. Then, any efficient network has the same architecture as gˆ = f11, 22, ..., nng. We first
characterize linear SPEs in Stage 2.
Lemma 2. Fix g. In any linear SPE (p(g), x(g)), price vector p(g) is given by for any j,
max
i2Lj(g)
pij (g) =
8><>:
0 if hj(g) = 0, 1
p˜j(g) if hj(g)  2.
Proof. It is obvious that pij (g) = 0 for all j with hj(g)  1.
Suppose that maxi2Lj(g) p
i
j (g) > p˜j(g) for some j. Then, there is a manufacturer i with
xij (g)  x˜ij(g) > 0 since åi xij (g) = åi x˜ij(g) = wj. By condition (i) in Definition 1, it is
profitable for such i to bid a non-linear schedule t¯ such that for e > 0,
t¯ij(x
i
j) =
8><>:
pij (g)x
i
j if x
i
j  xij (g)  e
pij (g)(x
i
j (g)  e) if xij > xij (g)  e.
Suppose thatmaxi2Lj(g) p
i
j (g) < p˜j(g) for some j. Then, there is amanufacturer iwhodeviate
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to non-linear schedule such that for e > 0 and y¯ij such that
d f i
dxi (y¯
i
j + x
i
 j(g)) = p
i
j + e,
t¯ij(x
i
j) =
8><>:
(pij (g) + e)x
i
j if x
i
j  y¯ij
(pij (g) + e)(x
i
j (g)  e) if xij > y¯ij.
Obviously, if no side-payment is available, then the efficient network gˆ is not pairwise Nash
stable. Since any supplier j has only one link, it is profitable for j to cut his link. Even if simple
contingent contracts are available, the efficient network gˆ is not pairwise Nash stable.
Proposition 7. Any efficient network gˆ is not PNSd in either the link announcement game and the network
formation game with direct side-payments.
Proof. First, consider the link announcement game. Then, pij (gˆ) = 0 for all j. Thus, it is profitable
to cut j’s link for any j .
Second, consider the network formation game with the direct side-payments. When g(t) = gˆ,
pij (g(t)) = 0. Since PSj(g)  2l for all j, it is profitable to deviates to form a new link ij /2 gˆ by
transferring l to manufacturer i for any supplier j.
Therefore, efficient trading is not pairwise Nash stable in the large market. The origins are the
same as n = 2: When no side-payments are available, the under-investment for suppliers arises.
When side-payments are available, the inefficiency is caused by the over-investment problem.
When n = 2 and link cost l is low, the complete network is PNSd. However, the complete
network is not PNSd whenever l > 0 in the large market with n  3. For any j and any g with
hj(g)  2,maxi pij (g) = p˜j(g). By symmetry, p˜j(gc) = p˜j(gc n f ij g) for any ij 2 gc. Thus, any
j has an incentive to cut at least one link in gc when n  3.
8 Concluding Remarks
We have studied decentralized trading in the strategically formed networked market between
manufacturers and suppliers. In contrast to the centralized trading in a buyer-seller networkedmar-
ket, we show that any efficient network is not pairwise Nash stable, regardless of the presence of
the side-payment contracts. When no side-payment contract is available, suppliers under-invest in
links. When side-payments are available, the complete network resulting in the Walrasian equilib-
rium outcome is the unique pairwise Nash stable network if link cost is low. However, it is not
efficient since the firms over-invest in links. Therefore, the efficient trading does not occur when
firms strategically form a trading network.
The study has two limitations. First, it is not known whether the same results holds in a large
market with heterogeneous firms. Shirata [12] further studies an allocation problem in a two-sided
15
networked market with asymmetric multi firms given a network. Second, we only consider a no-
side-payment contract and a simple side-payment contract. Some complex or complete contracts
may solve the inefficiency in the networked market.
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